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STUDENT NOTES
Likewise, he is subject to any counter-claim or set-off available to
the defendant.2'
Undoubtedly the two methods of obtaining jurisdiction which
have been discussed fall within the Holmes' concept. If the defend-
ant is physically present within the state-for however short a time
and for whatever reason and by whatever means-and is properly
served, he is subject to the jurisdiction of the court in any situation
in which it sees fit to exercise its power. The courts have, however,
refused to impose jurisdiction in certain fairly well defined situations
as a matter of policy rather than because of lack of power. Whether
physical power exists in the other instances in which jurisdiction is
exercised is beyond the scope of this note.
ROSANNA A. BLAKE
WAYS OF NECESSITY: SECURED BY STATUTE
At Common Law, where the owner of land sells a part with no
outlet to a public highway, it is implied that the vendor grants to
his vendee a right of way over his remaining land to enable the
latter to get to and from the part sold to him.' The Common Law
does not, however, afford any remedy to one whose land is entirely
surrounded by the lands of others giving him no access to a highway,
where no vendor-vendee relationship exists.'
In 1820 the Kentucky General Assembly began making pro-
visions for persons in these circumstances to obtain passways by
statutory proceedings. The first statute was very strict, allowing
passways only when they were proved to be absolutely and indis-
pensably necessary.' This original statute has been modified from
time to time, so that our present statute allows passways when it
appears to the county court, that it is necessary for a firm to have
a private passway over the land of another to enable him to attend
courts, elections, warehouses, etc.'
'This is usually so provided by statute. MASS. GEN. LAWS
(1932) c. 227, sec. 2. Aldrich v. Blatchford, 175 Mass. 369, 56 N. E.
700 (1900).
'Morgan v. Morgan, 205 Ky. 545, 266 S. W. 35 (1924); Damson
v. Damson, 27 K. L. R. 272, 84 S. W. 747 (1905); Beall v. Clore, 69
Ky. 676 (1869); Thomas v. Bertram, 67 Ky. 317 (1868); Brown v.
Burkenmeyer, 39 Ky. 159, 33 Am. Dec. 541 (1839).
2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (abd. ed., 1940) sec. 543, p. 554.
'II STATUTE LAWS OF KY. (1839) tit. 133, p. 1253.
1KRS 381.580: "Whenever it appears to a County Court that it
is necessary for a person to have a private passway over the land of
one or more persons to enable him to attend courts, elections, a meet-
ing house, a mill, warehouse, a ferry, a railroad depot, most conven-
ient to his residence, or to have a private tramroad or haul road over
the land of one or more persons to enable him to reach a warehouse,
steamboat landing, ferry, railroad switch, or navigable stream, for
the purpose of operating and marketing the products from a lead
mine, iron works, salt works, coal mine, fire clay, and other minerals,
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When a party applies for a passway under this statute it often
becomes necessary for the court to decide two questions: 1. Is the
way necessary? 2. Will it be for private or public use?
In answer to the first question, the earlier courts held to a strict
and absolute necessity as contemplated in the original statute. Be-
cause of this interpretation the number of passways allowed were
few. In Vice v. Edene a criterion was established when the Court
said that an applicant is not entitled to a passway for his mere con-
venience, but the word "necessary" in the statute is not to be read as
meaning "absolutely necessary." If the applicant's outlet to the
highway on his own ground, or the way he now has, does not afford
him practical access to the highway, and cannot be made to do so at
a reasonable expense, then he is entitled to the establishment of a
way as a necessity. Since this decision, courts have allowed pass-
ways even though there were several outlets to the highway possible
but not practical?
The most recent decision involving this subject was Perry v.
Hill.' The petitioner and defendant owned farms on opposite sides
of the public highway. A new highway was built, and at the point
in contest it was entirely within the land of defendant, cutting the
petitioner off from the new highway by five feet. The evidence
showed that the petitioner could construct a road on his own prop-
erty, one-fifth of a mile long, by which he could reach the new high-
way. The Court gave judgment for the petitioner, stating that the
establishment of this road would not be practical, and since the
taking of a right of way over the five-foot strip would do no appre-
ciable damage to the landowner, a way of necessity would warrant
taking the land.
In answering the second question the courts had greater diffi-
culty. The characteristic provision found in the Federal and state
constitutions, is to the effect that property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. While the courts have not
oil wells, stone quarry, sand bank or merchantable forest timber,
the Court shall appoint Commissioners, as in the case of a road. The
Commissioners, after being sworn to discharge their duty faithfully
and impartially, shall go upon the land through which the passway,
tramroad or haul road is proposed, whether arable or not, and shall
report in writing to the Court whether or not the private passway,
tramroad, or haul road is necessary for the purposes aforesaid.
If the Commissioners are favorable to the passway, tramroad or haul
road, they shall, in their report, designate the exact route for the
same by metes and bounds, courses and distances and width thereof,
which shall not exceed twenty feet, and shall determine and assess
what will be a just compensation to each owner and tenant for the
land proposed to be taken, in the manner as upon application to open
and establish a new road."
113 Ky. 255, 68 S. W. 125 (1902).
Goose Creek Lumber Co. v. White, 219 Ky. 739, 294 S. W. 494
(1927); Louisville and Nashville R. R. v. Ward, 150 Ky. 42, 149 S. W.
1145 (1912).
'275 Ky. 105, 120 S. W. (2d) 672 (1938).
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been in agreement as to the precise meaning of the term "public
use," it has been held without exception, that the State does not have
power to authorize the taking of one's property without his consent
for the private use of another, even on the payment of full compen-
sation.
Our Constitution does not define "public use."' It provides that
corporations or individuals authorized to take private property for
public use shall make just compensation for the property taken,
injured or destroyed by them. Many courts rule that, in order for
the property taken to be of "public use," it must be placed directly
under the control of public agencies; others have said that it must be
beneficially employed for the benefit of the community. The text
authorities on this subject are also in doubt as to the correct inter-
pretation of the term."'
In deciding the question in Chesapeake Stone Company v. More-
land," the court declared that a public interest which would be pro-
moted by the contemplated improvements, would not alone be suf-
ficient to authorize the taking, in the absence of the public right to
participate in the use of the property taken. If "public use" were
construed to mean that the public would be benefited in the sense
that the enterprise or improvement would contribute to the comfort
and convenience of the public, there would be absolutely no limit on
the right to take property.
The general rule now seems to be that it is not the number of
people who use the property taken that constitutes the use a public
one, nor does the fact that the benefit will be in a larger measure
local enter into the question. The controlling and decisive question
is: has the public the right to the use upon the same terms as the
person at whose instance the way was established?"
We now see how far the Kentucky courts have departed from
the original interpretation of the statute. Many states, having the
rectilinear survey system, would have held the cases cited uncon-
stitutional, as evidenced by their decisions in cases involving similar
facts. ' However, as there was no government land in Kentucky, it
was never affected by the rectilinear survey system, and the location
of public roads was made indiscriminately, whereas in the states
which have the rectilinear survey system, roads to every section were
provided for and reserved by the government along sectional lines.
'Am. JuR., Eminent Domain, sec. 34, p. 657.
"Ky. CONST., sec. 242.
'COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th ed., 1927) Vol. 2,
p. 1129; LEwIs, EMINENT DOMAIN (1888) sec. 165, p. 224.
" 126 Ky. 656, 104 S. W. 762 (1907).
" Fitzpatrick v. Warden, 157 Ky. 95, 162 S. W. 550 (1914); Calor
Oil and Gas Co. v. Frazell and Co., 128 Ky. 735, 109 S. W. 328 (1908);
Kirk-Christy Co. v. Louisville Property Co., 128 Ky. 668, 108 S. W.
232 (1908).
"Nesbitt v. Trumbo, 39 Ill. 111 (1866); Logan v. Stogdale, 123
Ind. 372, 24 N. E. 135 (1890); Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa 540
(1868); Osborne v. Hart, 24 Wis. 89 (1869).
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This system avoids the material changes in road location which are
frequently necessary in Kentucky. Often by these relocations of
roads, land is left without any practical access to a highway. There-
fore, we need a liberal interpretation of the statutes and Constitution
in order to obtain reasonable results based on present needs. The
problem will become more acute in the future, and it is necessary
that our courts apply and interpret the law in the manner consistent
with the growth and expansion of our Commonwealth as a whole.
A. E. FUNK, JR.
PROXIMATE CAUSE-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-TlFIE
LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE-CHESAPEAKE
AND OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY v. POE
The Kentucky Court of Appeals reached a somewhat startling
conclusion in the recent case of Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Com-
pany v. Pope.1 In this case, one Homer Ross Pope sought to recover
damages for the loss of a leg suffered when he was hit by a train of
the defendant railway while attempting to cross in front of it. Plain-
tiff had been talking to a friend near the tracks and was aware of the
fact that the train was coming. He decided to cross in front of it al-
though he knew that he was giving himself a margin of only a few
seconds, and that he would have to run in order to escape injury.
Pope, a mail carrier, had crossed the track many times before the
accident, and would have made it safely across on the occasion in
question if his foot had not caught in a hole negligently left there by
the defendant company. This hole, 3 to 4 inches in length, was
about 6 inches deep and situated next to the inside of the outer rail
on the eastbound track. There was evidence to the effect that if
Pope had had a few more seconds he could easily have stood up and
freed his foot, but the train was so close that perhaps the better
alternative was for him to move his body out of the way and not
run the risk of it being crushed when he attempted to arise. He
based his recovery upon the statutory negligence of the defendant
company in allowing the hole in the right-of-way to remain unre-
paired2
Defendant traversed the plaintiff's allegations and pleaded con-
tributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. This negligence
'296 Ky. 254, 176 S. W. (2d) 876 (1943).
2KRS 277.060(2) provides that "every railroad company
shall restore to its former condition, as near as may be, any . . .
highway, street . . . upon which it has constructed its road, and
shall maintain the same in that condition within the right of way
of the railroad company. It shall construct suitable road and street
crossings for the passage of traffic by putting down planks or
other suitable material between and on each side of the rails, the
top of which shall be at least as high as the top of the rails."
